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Note
FOURTH AND SHORT ON EQUALITY: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF THE
NFL’S USE OF THE WONDERLIC INTELLIGENCE TEST AND THE CASE
FOR A FOOTBALL-SPECIFIC TEST
CHRISTOPHER HATCH
Prior to being selected in the NFL draft, a player must undergo a
series of physical and mental evaluations, including the Wonderlic
Intelligence Test. The twelve-minute test, which measures “cognitive
ability,” has been shown to have a disparate impact on minorities in
various employment situations. This Note contends that the NFL’s use of
the Wonderlic also has a disparate impact because of its effect on a
player’s draft status and ultimately his salary. The test cannot be justified
by business necessity because there is no correlation between a player’s
Wonderlic score and their on-field performance. As such, this Note calls
for the creation of a football-specific intelligence test that would be less
likely to have a disparate impact than the Wonderlic, while also being
sufficiently job-related and more reliable in predicting a player’s success.
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FOURTH AND SHORT ON EQUALITY: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF THE
NFL’S USE OF THE WONDERLIC INTELLIGENCE TEST AND THE CASE
FOR A FOOTBALL-SPECIFIC TEST
CHRISTOPHER HATCH∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Every February, hundreds of college football players are invited to
Indianapolis to participate in the NFL combine, the league’s evaluation
program for potential NFL players. This “cattlecall”1 for NFL hopefuls
serves as an opportunity for personnel from every team to assess players’
speed, strength, durability and acumen before determining whom to select
in the NFL draft. Invitees to the combine are evaluated in many activities
including a 40-yard dash, bench press, vertical jump, injury examination,
personal interviews and an intelligence test.2
Every aspect of a player’s makeup is analyzed over the course of two
days—nothing is immaterial.3 There can be tremendous payoffs for those
who do well; successful performance can lead to a relatively obscure
prospect being drafted, or an already established player can increase his
value and ultimately his paycheck with an impressive showing.4 Tenths of
a second can literally equate to hundreds of thousands of dollars in gains or
losses.5
Testing a potential NFL player’s speed, strength and overall health is
∗

Brigham Young University, B.S. 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D.
Candidate, 2009. Many thanks to Professor Peter Siegelman for his comments and guidance
throughout the writing of this Note. All errors contained herein are mine and mine alone.
1
Pete Prisco, Cattle Call Under Way for Hopefuls at NFL Combine, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Feb.
21, 1999, at C9, available at LEXIS, News Library, FLATUN File.
2
Ryan Christopher DeVault, Wonderlic Test Begins at the 2009 NFL Combine; Every Prospect is
Required to Take It (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1494254/wonderlic_
test_begins_at_the_2009_nfl.html?cat=14; Nathan Rush, NFL Combine-Offense, ATHLON SPORTS,
Feb. 23, 2009, available at http://www.athlonsports.com/pro-football/16371/nfl-combine-offense; NFL
Scouting Combine, http://www.nfl.com/combine/workouts (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
3
Ryan Rigmaiden, Michael Allan Post-Combine Interview!, (Feb. 27, 2007),
http://sea.scout.com/2/622322.html (noting that potential NFL prospect Michael Allan was asked by
the Philadelphia Eagles staff in an interview “who [he] would call if [he] was thrown in jail and was
given . . . one phone call.”).
4
Michael Allan played college football in near-obscurity at Division III Whitworth University,
but due to his exceptional performance at the combine he was drafted by the Kansas City Chiefs in the
seventh round of the 2007 NFL draft.
See id.; ESPN NFL DraftTracker, Round 7,
http://insider.espn.go.com/nfldraft/draft/tracker/round?round=7&draftyear=2007 (last visited Mar. 18,
2009).
5
Jim Corbett, At the NFL Combine: Officials Reassess Wonderlic’s Value, USA TODAY, Feb. 23,
2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/draft/2007-02-22-combine-notebook_x.
htm (noting that running back Maurice Jones-Drew ran a 4.39 second 40-yard dash at the 2006
combine, which the Jaguars personnel suggested was a significant reason he was drafted 60th overall).
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undoubtedly essential in evaluating potential; however, the combine also
tests for “intelligence,” via the Wonderlic Personnel Test (Wonderlic), a
controversial IQ test that has been shown to have a disparate impact on
minority groups in a variety of employment situations.6 The theory of
disparate impact holds that it is unlawful under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act for an employer to use a facially neutral practice, such as a test
or educational requirement, which has an adversely disproportional impact
on a protected group, even without any discriminatory intent on the
employer’s part.7 If the test has an adverse impact, the employer can avoid
liability only if the test is shown to be “job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity . . . .”8
In the framework of the NFL Draft, the Wonderlic almost certainly has
a disparate impact because of its effect in determining draft ranking and
ultimately a player’s salary. Moreover, the test also does not appear to
accurately forecast future performance in the NFL. As such, this Note
concludes that the NFL’s use of the Wonderlic cannot be justified by
business necessity and would likely fail a Title VII disparate impact
challenge. This Note calls for the creation of a football-specific
“intelligence” examination that would be less likely to have a disparate
impact on a player’s draft status and salary. Such a test would also be
sufficiently job-related and more reliable in predicting a player’s success.
This Note will give a brief explanation of the Wonderlic test and its
relation to disparate impact law. Then, in order to show that the test has a
disparate impact on NFL draft pick selection, the Note will focus on the
relationship between quarterbacks’ Wonderlic scores, their draft positions,
and their performance on the field. Quarterbacks’ Wonderlic scores are the
easiest to procure and the most useful to examine because their on-field
performance is the most straightforward to evaluate and the position is
generally regarded as the most cerebral.9 If the test does not predict
quarterbacks’ future performance, a fortiori, it will be even less likely to
predict the performance of players in less intellectually-demanding
positions. In the interest of full disclosure, the data used in my analysis is
not publicly available, but has been leaked through many different sources.
6
Michael A. Reiter, Compensating for Race or National Origin in Employment Testing, 8 LOY.
U. CHI. L. J. 687, 699–702 (1977).
7
See BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 109–
10 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining that “disparate treatment focuses on discriminatory intent while adverse
impact focuses on discriminatory consequences”).
8
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
9
Michael Callans, President of Wonderlic Consulting stated that “[s]electing a new quarterback is
like hiring a president for a company . . . They need the intelligence to think on their feet, evaluate all
of their options and understand the impact their actions will have on the outcome of the game.”
Intelligence Testing in the National Football League, NFL Testing Provides Valuable Lesson for All
Employees (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.assessmentpsychology.com/nfl.htm [hereinafter Intelligence
Testing].
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Because the data is not completely reliable, I will only be offering a
preliminary evaluation of the test’s link to performance on the field.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WONDERLIC
The Wonderlic Personnel Test was developed by industrial
psychologist Eldon F. Wonderlic and first distributed in 1937.10 The test,
which measures “cognitive ability,” contains fifty questions that become
progressively harder and must be completed in twelve minutes.11
Wonderlic, Inc.—a for-profit corporation that markets the test—claims that
the test is long enough to ensure validity while short enough not to
intimidate.12 Wonderlic representatives say that the test is administered
3,000,000 times a year, for different levels of employment, and by about
7,000 of their clients.13 The score is calculated by simply totaling the
number of correct answers in the allotted time;14 a score of twenty-one is
equivalent to the intelligence of a high school graduate and constitutes an
approximate average score in the United States.15 The NFL is the only
sports league that uses the test.16
The history of the Wonderlic’s use in the NFL is unclear, but one of its
most ardent proponents was Tom Landry, former head coach of the Dallas
Cowboys in the early 1970’s.17 Landry, who wanted to evaluate more than
just on-field performance, contended that players who used their minds
would have a strategic advantage over the other teams in the league.18
After the Cowboys began using the test, other teams followed suit, leading
to today’s NFL-wide administration of the Wonderlic at the combine.19
III. THE NFL’S USE OF THE WONDERLIC AND DISPARATE IMPACT
The claim of disparate impact in employment discrimination law arose
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which made any forms of
discrimination in the workplace illegal.20 Title VII forbids discrimination
in all aspects of employment on the basis of race, color, national origin,
10

Wonderlic: Our History, http://www.wonderlic.com/about-us.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
Darren Rovell, Grading Wonderlic and the Best Sports Video Game, (Feb. 21, 2007),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/17258325; Wonderlic: Our History, supra note 10.
12
Wonderlic: Our History, supra note 10.
13
Rovell, supra note 11.
14
McDonald P. Mirabile, Intelligence and Football: Testing for Differentials in Collegiate
Quarterback Passing Performance and NFL Compensation, 8 SPORT J. 2005, available at
http://www.thesportjournal.org/tags/2005?page=2.
15
Reiter, supra note 6, at 702; Rovell, supra note 11.
16
Rovell, supra note 11.
17
Intelligence Testing, supra note 9.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Michael S. Beer, Title VII Today: The Shift Away From Equality, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 525,
525 (1987).
11
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sex, and religion and has been developed through two separate legal
theories—disparate treatment and disparate impact.21 Disparate treatment,
which encompasses intentional acts of employment discrimination and
may be applicable in relation to the NFL in other respects, is not a focus of
this Note.22
As stated above, the theory of disparate impact holds that it is unlawful
for an employer to use a facially neutral practice, such as a test or
educational requirement, which has a disproportionately adverse impact on
a protected group, even without a showing of the employer’s
discriminatory intent.23 The seminal disparate impact case is Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., in which the Supreme Court struck down an employer’s
hiring and promotion practices as being in violation of § 703 of Title VII.24
In that case, the plaintiffs challenged an employer’s requirement of a
passing score on two intelligence tests (one of which was the Wonderlic)
or a high school education as a condition for employment or promotion.25
The Griggs Court noted that Section 703(h) provides it shall not be an
“unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to give and to act upon
the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such
test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended
or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin . . . .”26 But the Court also held that tests, even if impartial on their
face and in terms of intent, may be illegal under Title VII if their results are
disproportionately adverse to minority groups.27 This adverse impact was
apparent when the Court noted EEOC studies finding that the use of
intelligence tests, including the Wonderlic, resulted in passage rates for
whites of fifty-eight percent, compared to six percent for blacks.28
21

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, MAJOR ISSUES IN THE FEDERAL LAW
7 (4th ed. 2004).
See Tom Gage, National Pastime Strikes Out with Black Athletes; Kids in Michigan, U.S.
Choose the Flash of NFL and NBA Over Baseball’s Slow Pace, THE DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 10, 2005 at
1A, available at LEXIS, News Library, DETNWS File (noting that in 2004, sixty-nine percent of NFL
players were black). For a cogent analysis of racial discrimination in the NFL, see Jason Chung, Racial
Discrimination and African-American Quarterbacks in the National Football League 1968–1999,
MCGILL U. 4–9 (NOV. 29, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=835204. The article points to two flawed arguments that have been used to show why
African-American quarterbacks are not as successful in the NFL—the option argument and the
intelligence argument. Id. The option argument notes that the NFL uses a pass-oriented offensive
system which is more complex than option offenses that many black quarterbacks used in high school
or college. Id. at 4. An option offense relies primarily on a quarterback’s athletic ability to run the ball
himself or choose to lateral the ball to a teammate. Id. at 5. The author notes that there was prejudice
against option quarterbacks because of the simplicity of the offense. Id. at 6. The intelligence
argument, driven by the use of the Wonderlic, will be examined in this Note.
23
LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 109–10.
24
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
25
Id. at 425–26, 428.
26
Id. at 426 n.1 (citations omitted).
27
Id. at 431.
28
Id. at 430 n.6 (citations omitted).
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
22

2009]

NFL’S WONDERLIC TEST

1675

The Griggs Court concluded,
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude [members of
a protected group] cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.29
To determine business necessity, the Court examined the evidence and
noted that employees who had not graduated from high school or who had
not take the intelligence tests had still been able to satisfactorily perform
the duties of their job and that the company had not made a showing that
the promotion requirements fulfilled a “genuine business need.”30
The Supreme Court clarified the theory of disparate impact in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, a case that established the framework with
which to bring a claim.31 The facts of the case were similar to those in
Griggs; in order to receive a promotion or seniority advancement an
employee had to have a high school diploma and pass two intelligence
tests, one of which was the Wonderlic.32 Intending to show that their tests
met the business necessity standard, the defendants hired an industrial
psychologist to validate the job relatedness of its testing program.33 The
study, validated at the trial level, showed a statistically significant
correlation between test scores and ratings from supervisors,34 but the
Supreme Court rejected the legitimacy of the study based on, among other
factors, the subjectivity of these ratings.35
The Court proceeded to elaborate on the allocation of the burden of
proof in a disparate impact claim by holding that the complaining party
must “ma[k]e out a prima facie case of discrimination, i.e., has shown that
the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial
pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants.”36 From
there, the employer must show that their employment tests which have a
discriminatory effect have a “manifest relationship” to the job in
question.37 If the employer meets their burden of showing that their test is
29

Id. at 431.
Id. at 432.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
32
Id. at 410–11.
33
Id. at 411.
34
Id.
35
See id. at 431–36 (noting that the validation study was also defective because it produced an
“odd patchwork of results” in that the test only showed significant correlation in two of the eight skilled
lines of progression within the company, it mainly focused on the top job groups, and only dealt with
job-experienced white workers and not job applicants, who were often non-white).
36
Id. at 425.
37
Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
30
31

1676

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1669

job related, “it remains open to the complaining party to show that other
tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect,
would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and
trustworthy workmanship.’”38
This framework for disparate impact was ultimately codified through
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as Section 703(k) of Title VII.39 First, the
plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case that the defendant “uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”40 At that point, the
burden of production and persuasion is shifted to the employer to show that
their practice or selection device is “job related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity . . . .”41 If the employer is
successful at this stage, the plaintiff then has the burden to show that the
employer refused to implement an alternative hiring practice that could
achieve the same legitimate business goal with less adverse impact.42
The difficulty of making a prima facie case in an NFL draft context is
that unlike Griggs and other cases in which the Wonderlic has been
administered to potential employees, NFL teams apparently do not use a
cutoff score; instead they employ the test as one factor among many in
determining draft position (and ultimately, salary). When sufficiently high
cutoff scores are used, the test can indisputably have a disparate impact on
minorities.43 For example, if an employer’s minimum passing score is 21,
the level of a high school graduate, 75.1% of all black applicants would be
excluded compared to 34.9% of all white applicants44—certainly enough to
show a significant disparity.
This analysis cannot be directly applied to the NFL’s use of the
Wonderlic, however, because the test does not form a rigid barrier to
employment; if an individual’s athletic ability is high enough, he will be
38

Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 110.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). Alternatively, if the complaining party cannot separate
the respondent’s employment practices in order to show a specific practice that has a disparate impact,
“the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.” Id. §2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
41
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
42
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
43
See Reiter, supra note 6, at 701 (noting that a “very stable differential in raw scores achieved
by Negro Applicant Populations exists . . . These mean score differentials are, as other researchers have
noted in the study of mental ability, about one standard deviation apart when comparisons of
Caucasians and Negroes are studied.”) (citation omitted). Unfortunately, my research could not find
any more recent data on white or black Wonderlic performance. However, significant research on test
score disparities between races is readily available. See Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The
Black-White Test Score Gap, in THE AFRICAN AMERICAN PREDICAMENT 63, 63 (Christopher H.
Foreman, Jr. ed., 1999) (noting that “African Americans score lower than European Americans on
vocabulary, reading, and math tests as well as on tests that claim to measure scholastic aptitude and
intelligence” and that “the typical American black still scores below 75 percent of American whites on
almost every standardized test.”).
44
Reiter, supra note 6, at 702.
39
40
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drafted regardless of his score on the Wonderlic. Nevertheless, it is
indisputable that the Wonderlic often plays a factor in a team’s decision of
whom to draft,45 and therefore, how much money to offer a player after he
has been drafted. The fact that there is not a cutoff score should not
preclude a plaintiff’s prima facie case. If the test is used to determine draft
position, it will invariably have a disparate impact on a player’s salary in
the NFL; on average minorities will score lower on the test and thus be
drafted later leading to a decrease in salary, or a player’s poor performance
on the test could lead to them not being drafted at all.46 Proving wagebased disparate impact in this context presents unique challenges that will
be discussed below.
Although disparate impact claims are generally developed through
examining impacts on a group, the Supreme Court has stressed that the
essential protection provided by Title VII is the opportunity for the
individual to be treated fairly.47 The notion of protecting the individual’s
opportunity is crucial in evaluating the NFL’s use of the Wonderlic. The
NFL would likely argue that many black athletes have scored poorly on the
Wonderlic and still been drafted in the first round, including quarterbacks
Vince Young,48 Jason Campbell,49 and Akili Smith,50 thus suggesting the
absence of any disparate impact in the selection process. However, there
are players whose draft status possibly tumbled as a result of poor
45
Michael Callans, President of Wonderlic Consulting, said he thinks “all teams look at
[Wonderlic scores] to some degree. I haven’t had a team tell me that they didn’t think it was of any
value at all.” See Rovell, supra note 11.
46
The prima facie case of disparate impact in this context cannot be rebutted by the fact that a
strong majority of the players in the NFL are black. This argument, known as a “bottom line” defense,
was rejected by the Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445, 453 (1982). In that case,
an employer used a written examination, shown to have a disparate impact, in its promotion decisions.
Id. at 443–44, n.3. The employer raised a bottom-line defense, asserting that despite the written test,
22.9% of blacks who passed the examination were promoted, compared to 13.5% of whites, so that in
the end, blacks were overrepresented among those who actually got jobs. Id. at 444. The Court turned
to the language of Title VII which states that it is unlawful to “‘limit . . . or classify . . . applicants for
employment . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities.’” Id. at 448 (emphasis original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)(2006)).
47
Teal, 457 U.S. at 448.
48
Perhaps the most notorious example of a Wonderlic score being leaked occurred when
University of Texas quarterback Vince Young’s score at the 2006 NFL combine surfaced. Young,
whose draft stock rose one month earlier after almost single-handedly beating the University of
Southern California in the Rose Bowl, entered the combine as a certain top four pick, but when a score
of 6 was reported for Young, his status as a prototype quarterback began to be questioned. See Pete
Doherty & Jim Wyatt, Will Wonderlic Cause Teams to Wonder about Young? (Mar. 1, 2006),
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/draft/2006-03-01-young-wonderlic_x.htm. According to Jeep
Chryst, a former NFL assistant attending the combine as an at-large scout, Young’s extremely low
score “raise[d] a huge red flag.” Id. Different sources began to report that the test was administered or
graded incorrectly. Id. Young took the test again approximately two weeks later and scored a 16, still
below average for non-college graduates and lower than the mid-20 range that NFL teams are looking
for in a quarterback. Id.
49
Michael A. McCann, The Wonderlic Test for the NFL Draft: Linking Stereotype Threat and the
Law 26 (Oct. 1, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934307).
50
Id.
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51

Wonderlic scores.
Such a fall in draft standing is more likely to affect African-American
football players, especially African-American quarterbacks who on
average score under twenty on the Wonderlic more often than their white
counterparts.52 To succeed in establishing a prima facie case of disparate
impact in this context a plaintiff would have to show, through statistical
analysis, that minority players as a group score lower than whites on the
Wonderlic (which is undisputed),53 that they are drafted later than they
would have been had the test not been administered, and that as a result the
test has a disparate impact on minority players’ salaries.54
Through empirical research conducted for this Note, I compiled
Wonderlic scores for 104 quarterbacks from 1999 to 2006 (Figure 1). The
Wonderlic scores used in my analysis come from Mac Mirabile’s
website.55 Mirabile states that his results come from personal research and
generally reliable sources, including notes from scouts and newspaper
articles.56 Nevertheless, because the scores are not made public knowledge
they cannot be completely verified.57 The data confirms that there is a
marked disparity between black and white quarterbacks. Figure 2 shows
the average Wonderlic scores and standard deviation by race, with number
of observations. This data shows that black quarterbacks score, on
average, a full 7.75 points lower than their white counterparts on the
Wonderlic. In addition, there is good evidence that the higher a
quarterback scores on the Wonderlic the earlier he is drafted. In other
words, NFL teams do use the Wonderlic, among other things, in
determining draft order, and hence, in setting salary. Figure 3 plots the
Wonderlic score and the draft position of each of these quarterbacks. The
downward sloping regression line implies that as a player’s test score has a
51

See id. at 26–27 (noting quarterbacks Jeff Blake, Kordell Stewart, Anthony Wright, and
Randall Cunningham’s draft status may have suffered as a result of the Wonderlic). Blake, Stewart,
White, and Cunningham all scored under twenty on the Wonderlic. NFL Quarterback Wonderlic
Scores, http://www.unc.edu/~mirabile/Wonderlic.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
52
Chung, supra note 22, at 7.
53
See supra text accompanying note 39.
54
See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN
THEORY AND DOCTRINE 80 (2nd ed. 2007) (“The disparity revealed by statistical evidence should be
both statistically and practically significant . . . .”). A successful plaintiff would also have to convince
a court that the test was not job related and consistent with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
55
NFL Quarterback Wonderlic Scores, http://www.unc.edu/~mirabile/Wonderlic.htm (last visited
Apr. 6, 2009).
56
Id. Although the NFL takes precautions to ensure that Wonderlic scores are not released to the
public, as fans’ interest in the combine has increased so have leaks of individual players scores. Sam
Walker, The NFL’s Smartest Team, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2005 at W1, available at LEXIS, News
Library, WSJNL File (stating that National Football Scouting Inc., which runs the NFL combine, has
closed the test to team personnel and upon the end of the combine burns the test scores on thirty-two
DVDs and sends it by Federal Express to each team to prevent leaks).
57
Id.
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positive effect on his expected draft position. The estimated equation for
this line is
Draft # = 165 – 1.95 x Wonderlic Score
(t-stat) (t-stat)
What this means is that a player with a Wonderlic score of 0 would be
predicted to be drafted #165 and each additional point on the Wonderlic
score raises a quarterback’s draft number by just under two positions. The
p-value (a statistic that measures the probability of obtaining a result at
least as extreme as the one observed) for this analysis is 0.113, which is
close to statistical significance at the ten percent level.58
Looking at the data another way, I examined drafted quarterbacks who
scored greater than or equal to one standard deviation above and below the
mean score in my sample (26.25) to show the impact of the test on a
player’s draft status and future salary (Figure 4). This analysis did not
show statistical significance, largely because of the small sample size and
the substantial deviations in draft numbers within both the high-scoring
and low-scoring groups. The average draft position of those who scored
greater than or equal to 33 (one standard deviation above) on the
Wonderlic was 107.8. Of those who scored less than or equal to 19 (one
standard deviation below) the average draft position was 136.4. While a
difference of over twenty-eight draft slots is not shocking, it is also not
insignificant—with thirty-two teams in the league, it equates to being
drafted almost one full round later and likely having a smaller rookie
contract. For example, the difference in average annual salary between the
108th pick and 137th in the 2008 NFL Draft was $69,500.59 Because black
quarterbacks score lower on the test than whites,60 the Wonderlic would
have a disparate impact on their salary.
The inherent problem in making this prima facie case is that the
Wonderlic test is not used as the sole factor to set a player’s salary. There
are many other factors that are used in assessing a player including speed,
58
The p-value measures the probability of getting a difference between the sample mean and the
null hypothesis which is numerically greater or equal to that actually observed. Generally, in order to
show statistical significance the p-value must be smaller than or equal to the significance level. See
JOHN E. FREUND & GARY A. SIMON, MODERN ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 314 (8th ed. 1992).
59
After being drafted 108th by the Denver Broncos, Kory Lichtensteiger signed a four-year
$2.189 million dollar contract. Kory Lichtensteiger, http://www.rotoworld.com/Content/player
pages/player_main.aspx?sport=nfl&id=4816 (last visited Apr. 6, 2009); 2008 NFL Draft Round 4
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/2008/draft/breakdowns/by_rounds/4.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2009). John David Booty, drafted 137th by the Minnesota Vikings, signed a four-year $1.911 million
dollar contract.
John David Booty, http://www.rotoworld.com/Content/playerpages/player_
main.aspx?sport=NFl&id=4732 (last visited Apr. 6, 2009); 2008 NFL Draft, Round 4
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/2008/draft/breakdowns/by_rounds/4.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2009).
60
Of the 103 quarterbacks sampled in the above analysis, seventy-eight white quarterbacks had an
average score of 28.15 and twenty-five black quarterbacks had an average of 20.4. See infra, Figure 2.

1680

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1669
61

strength, interview skills, and college performance.
It is concededly
difficult for any individual player to show how heavily his Wonderlic score
weighed in a team’s decision to not draft him. A team can point to many
other factors besides Wonderlic scores as reasons for not drafting a
particular player. However, a compelling argument has been made by Ian
Ayres that these other factors must be ignored in a disparate impact case in
order to determine if they cause a racial disparity.62 Ayres notes that
controlling for non-race factors is inappropriate because the purpose of the
analysis is to see if these non-race factors cause racial disparities.63 Thus,
attempting to control for these other factors (college performance, physical
tests, etc.) can bias the determination as to whether the employer’s policies
causes an unjustified disparate impact.
Secondly, because the NFL is more popular than ever; the demand for
combine and draft information is insatiable, including twenty-six hours of
live coverage of the combine on the NFL Network.64 There are many
sources that leak Wonderlic scores to the public and the media often
belittles players with low test results.65 It is entirely possible that as
players’ scores become public knowledge, it could more readily affect
teams’ decisions regarding which prospects to select, thus worsening the
already disparate effect of the Wonderlic on future NFL players.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF DISPARATE IMPACT IN SALARY SETTING
Although this Note does not cover a classic disparate impact claim
based on a facially neutral test affecting the selection rates of a protected
class, the making of a prima facie case by a plaintiff should not be
prohibited if he can show that the NFL’s use of the Wonderlic resulted in
black players being drafted later and thus receiving a smaller initial
contract. Courts have addressed disparate impact in relation to wage in
many circumstances, including the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

61
See Dougherty & Wyatt, supra note 48 (noting that “[i]n addition to the Wonderlic, teams also
determine a player’s intelligence through interviews and their success in school.”).
62
Ian Ayres, Three Tests for Measuring Unjustified Disparate Impacts in Organ Transplantation:
The Problem of Included Variable Bias 2 (Dec. 28, 2003) (unpublished Yale Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 290, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=483242)
(stating that it is “necessary to intentionally omit non-race based variables from a regression to test
whether those variables produced a racially disparate impact.”).
63
Id.
64
Jon Ourand, Reebok to Sponsor NFL Network’s Scouting Combine Coverage (Feb. 15, 2008),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/118558.
65
McCann, supra note 50 at 22 (noting that there are “myriad sources of leaks” including team
officials, players’ agents, rival agents and players themselves). After Vince Young scored a 6 on his
first Wonderlic attempt, one author wrote that “Young is perceived as laying an IQ egg that might kill
the draft goose . . . .” Jon Saraceno, Who Knows if this Longhorn is Short on IQ, USA TODAY, Feb. 28,
2006,
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/columnist/saraceno/2006-02-28-saracenoyoung_x.htm.
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(ADEA) in Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi. That case involved a
group of plaintiff police officers that challenged the City’s salary increases
because they were more generous to officers under the age of forty.67 The
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs’ could not make a disparate impact
claim because they did not identify a specific test, requirement, or practice
that had an adverse impact on older workers.68 Because no prima facie
case could be made, the Court found the City’s intention to raise salaries in
order to become competitive with regional averages sufficiently related to
the goal of retaining the police force and a reasonable factor other than
age.69
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed wage-based disparate
impact in the context of sex discrimination in American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) v. State of
Washington.70 In that case, state female employees in job categories of at
least seventy percent female brought suit alleging Title VII sex
discrimination in compensation.71 The plaintiffs claimed that they were
compensated at lower rates than employees in jobs where males
predominate, although evidence existed that the jobs were of comparable
worth.72 The court held that the decision to base compensation on market
forces “involves the assessment of a number of complex factors not easily
ascertainable, an assessment too multifaceted to be appropriate for
disparate impact analysis.”73 It further reasoned that a compensation
system based on supply and demand is not the type of employment practice
contemplated by Griggs because it does not constitute a single, specific
employment practice that has a disparate impact.74
However, the notion of disparate impact in salary setting has not been
fully explored by the courts—in fact, after thorough research I could only
find one case directly on point. In Donnelly v. Rhode Island Board of
Governors for Higher Education, certain female faculty members at the
University of Rhode Island contended that the university’s salary plan had
a disparate impact on women’s pay.75 The plan had progressively higher
minimum salaries for the humanities tier, natural sciences tier, and
business tier.76 The plaintiffs contended that because a greater percentage
66

Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005).
Id. at 230.
68
Id. at 241.
69
Id. at 242.
70
Am. Fed. of State, County, and Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. State of Wash., 770 F.2d 1401,
1403 (9th Cir. 1985).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 1403–04.
73
Id. at 1406.
74
Id.
75
Donnelly v. R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 110 F.3d 2, 4 (1st Cir. 1997).
76
Id. at 2.
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of women were in the lower paying tiers, this pay schedule disparately
impacted their salaries.77 The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected their
claim, finding that the faculty members’ choice of academic field
combined with the national market, rather that the plan itself, was
responsible for the differences in salary between tiers.78
These cases, although relevant, are distinguishable from the NFL Draft
context. Unlike City of Jackson and AFSCME, a specific employment
practice, namely the use of the Wonderlic, is identifiable as creating a
disparate impact on the salaries of minority football players. The test is
administered to all potential draft picks and those who score lower on the
test are, on average, drafted later and receive smaller initial contracts.79
Also, the market forces defense is not appropriate because the NFL is a
monopsonistic employer; there is no competitive market wage for football
players because the NFL comprises the entire market. Hence, the ordinary
reply of “we’re just paying market wages” does not apply here. Because
potential NFL players have no equally lucrative employment opportunities,
the league cannot justify a competitive market defense.80
The NFL’s use of the Wonderlic is unusual because it is a factor in
determining an employee’s salary. An employment test is typically used,
as mentioned in Griggs above, to see if an individual is qualified to do the
job81—salary is then based on the job itself. Because the NFL is such a
unique employer it is not surprising that few cases are analogous.
Intelligence test scores rarely determine wages; instead they are used to
make hiring decisions. The evidence presented in this Note shows that test
scores are used to determine wages in the NFL. A player that scores
higher on the Wonderlic is, on average, drafted earlier and therefore
receives a higher salary. Consequently, because blacks score lower than
whites on the Wonderlic, the test has a disparate impact on minority
players’ salaries.
V. BUSINESS NECESSITY
Once a prima facie case is established, the NFL would have the burden
of production and persuasion to show that the use of the Wonderlic is “job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. .
77

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 5.
79
See supra text accompanying notes 43–46, 51, 58–60.
80
Ian Ayres contends that the market power defense, rooted in profitability, should be rejected by
courts when used to extract super-competitive profits. Paying employees less than their marginal
product because they have few alternatives should not be a business justification. Ian Ayres, Market
Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard For Assessing When Disparate Impacts are
Unjustified, 95 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673–74 (2007).
81
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (noting that an employment test must be
shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to job-performance ability).
78
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. . ” Arguably, the interpretation of the phrase “business necessity” is
still unclear, however, because in Griggs, the terms “job-related” and
“business necessity” were used synonymously.83 These terms can have
entirely different levels of application, leading to different conclusions.84
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the standard in Dothard v.
Rawlinson it stated that a challenged employment practice must be
“necessary to safe and efficient job performance,”85 but later relaxed the
employer’s required showing in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, by
calling for the challenged practice to “serve[], in a significant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer.”86 The 1991 Civil Rights
Act overruled that portion of Wards Cove, and returned to the “job related
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity”
standard,87 but despite this, no universal definition exists.88 For example,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that in order for a cutoff score on
a test to be job-related it must equal the minimum qualifications necessary
to do the job.89
It is undisputed that in some vocations a job applicant’s Wonderlic
score meets the business necessity standard because it is a valid predictor
of job performance. For example, it has been used and upheld for jobs in a
chemical manufacturing plant,90 and is routinely used to select dental
hygienists and some entry-level workers.91 However, courts have found it
not to be “job related” in the context of promotion within a paper mill,92 or
in hiring employees at a power plant.93 What becomes apparent is that the
Wonderlic’s justification under business necessity is almost never certain,
regardless of the employment position. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) personnel selection guidelines require statistical
evidence that the “selection procedure is predictive of or significantly
correlated with important elements of job performance.”94 This section
presents evidence that these EEOC standards are not met because
Wonderlic scores do not predict performance in the NFL.
82

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 148.
84
Id. at 148–52 (noting the federal appellate courts’ different interpretations of the two terms).
85
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977).
86
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
87
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
88
See Ayres, supra note 80, at 670 (stating that “a persuasive answer [to the business justification
defense] has eluded both scholars and judges.”).
89
See Lanning v. S. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 181 F.3d 478, 489 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that a
“discriminatory cutoff score is impermissible unless shown to measure the minimum qualifications
necessary for successful performance of the job in question.”).
90
Cormier v. P.P.G. Indus., 519 F. Supp. 211, 214, 255 (W.D. La. 1981).
91
Rovell, supra note 11.
92
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 435–36 (1975).
93
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971).
94
29 C.F.R § 1607.5(B) (2008).
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Analysis of the “business necessity” issue in the NFL context is
challenging because there is no uniform way that all thirty-two teams “use”
the test. Some teams use the information to guide selections in later rounds
when less information is available on specific players.95 Other teams
apparently weigh the test more heavily the closer the player is to the ball,
under the theory that those who regularly touch the ball have to make more
strategic decisions.96 While seemingly all coaches are skeptical of the test,
almost all of them use it in some form while evaluating players.97 Once the
test is shown to have a disparate impact, if it is used, the scores must
sufficiently relate to job performance.98
Not surprisingly, Wonderlic Inc., the company that administers the
test, is convinced that its test meets “business necessity” standards
primarily because of the amount of money involved in selecting a draft
pick.99 However, such reasoning is unlikely to satisfy any definition of the
admittedly vague phrase “business necessity.” Others claim that due to the
complexities of the play calling in the modern NFL, a Wonderlic score can
point to a player’s aptitude to memorize an intricate playbook,100 but this
assertion would have to be proven by showing that a player’s memorizing
ability was significantly correlated with Wonderlic score.101 Either way, at
95

Rovell, supra note 11.
See McCann, supra note 50, at 21 (noting that players who touch the ball more frequently in a
game are required to use a higher level of thinking than those who play more physical, rudimentary,
positions); see also Dougherty & Wyatt, supra note 48 (noting that former Baltimore Ravens coach
Brian Billick expects quarterbacks to score higher on the Wonderlic than other positions based on their
responsibilities on the field).
97
Super Bowl champion coach Tony Dungy said, “The ability to win, delivering in the clutch
cannot be measured with pen and paper . . . . We have had some really ‘Wonderlic Smart’ guys who
turned
out
to
be
‘football
dumb.’”
See
Jon
Entine,
Dark
Thoughts,
http://www.jonentine.com/articles/dark_thoughts_recon.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). Nevertheless,
Dungy still reviews every score. Id. Pittsburgh Steelers coach Mike Tomlin stated that “[p]ersonally,
I’ve never been a Wonderlic guy. . . . It doesn’t measure football intelligence. You don’t know the
background, the way guys have prepared for the test. You’ve got to go based on your interactions with
people and what you see on tape.” Corbett, supra note 5. But see Entine, supra (noting that former
Minnesota Vikings coach Dennis Green said regarding the Wonderlic scores, “I never pay any attention
to them. . . . I don’t even look at the score. The only thing I’m concerned about is how the guy has
performed of [sic] the field.”).
98
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
99
See Intelligence Testing, supra note 9 (noting that given the investment involved a draft pick,
teams need all the information they can get). Michael Callans, President of Wonderlic Consulting
stated that“[w]hether you are hiring a mailroom clerk or a CEO, a defensive lineman or a quarterback,
intelligence is an accurate determiner of success . . . Smart people achieve more, they are better leaders,
and they add greater value to the company.” Id.
100
Walker, supra note 56 (noting that “[i]f the coach calls ‘zero type wing ride,’ for instance, each
player has to know instantly what to do, where his teammates will be going and how to adjust to the
other team's behavior”). Tampa Bay Buccaneers general manager and Wonderlic proponent Bruce
Allen, whose 2005 offensive line averaged Wonderlic scores above 30 (higher than the average
attorney’s score) said, “You need to ‛get it’ quick . . . We don’t have a lot of patience in the NFL right
now.” Id.
101
See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(B) (2008) (stating that a valid test should predict an important element
of the job).
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this stage the NFL would have the burden of showing a business
justification for its use of the Wonderlic.102 When most employers’
selection practices are challenged, they present their own validation studies
to the court.103 So-called “criterion validation,” which is most often used
in evaluating tests, involves comparing test performance with the outcome
the test is designed to predict.104
There are two types of criterion validation: predictive and
concurrent.105 Predictive validation would require the NFL to administer
the Wonderlic at the combine, but not release the scores to the teams. The
teams would then select their draft picks and after a certain interval of
time, job performance would be evaluated. A comparison of predicted
performance (based on the test score) with actual performance would be
used to assess the test’s validity.106 If the test was not sufficiently
correlated with actual performance it would be invalid.107 Concurrent
validation would require that the Wonderlic be administered to players
already in the NFL who are representative of candidates “normally
available in the relevant labor market for the job . . . in question.”108 These
test scores would be compared with their current level of ability. This
could be unnecessary because almost all players in the NFL have already
taken the Wonderlic in preparation for the draft and a finding of jobrelatedness could be based on those earlier scores. Moreover, scores on the
test would not reflect work experience gained by the player already on the
job, obfuscating the correlation between test scores and criterion.109 In
other words, a player’s Wonderlic score might not increase corollary to his
knowledge and expertise gained while playing in the league.
This Note contends that neither concurrent nor predictive validation
would show that a football player’s Wonderlic score predicts his future
success in the NFL. McDonald P. Mirable examined the relationship
between “intelligence” based on the Wonderlic and football ability in NFL
rookie quarterbacks between 1989 and 2004.110 Through empirical
analysis he concluded that “there exists no statistically significant
relationship between intelligence and quarterback performance at either the
collegiate or professional level.”111 Mirabile concluded that if the
Wonderlic had no relation to ability, the NFL would be better suited to
102

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 27.01 (2d ed. 2006).
104
Id. at § 27.01(1).
105
Id.
106
See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(C)(4).
107
See id. § 1607.14(B)(5) (noting that a selection procedure is generally valid when performance
on the procedure and performance on the measured criterion is statistically significant at the 0.05 level).
108
Id. § 1607.14(B)(4).
109
LARSON, supra note 103, at § 27.01(1)(b).
110
Mirabile, supra note 14.
111
Id.
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spend their time and resources in some other way.
In order to evaluate the Wonderlic’s ability to predict a quarterback’s
success over their career, I compiled the Wonderlic scores and
corresponding NFL passer rating of 116 quarterbacks over the past four
decades (Figure 5).113 The passer rating is a statistic based on four
categories—percentage of completions per attempt, average yards gained
per attempt, percentage of touchdown passes per attempt, and percentage
of interceptions per attempt.114 A passer rating can range from 0.0 to
158.3.115 The league regular season average in 2008 for qualified
quarterbacks (defined as quarterbacks who threw at least fourteen passes
per game played) was 84.2.116 The statistic has its weaknesses; it does not
measure intangibles such as leadership, play calling, or meaningful
touchdowns, but it has been consistently used since 1973.117
Although a passer rating can be determined after a quarterback has
thrown one attempt,118 only quarterbacks who had attempted at least
twenty-five passes were included in my analysis to give a reasonable
sample size. If “intelligence” as measured by the Wonderlic was necessary
to be a successful NFL quarterback, one would expect a positive
correlation to exist between Wonderlic score and passer rating. In other
words, using Figure 6 with the X-axis representing Wonderlic score and
the Y-axis representing NFL passer rating, there should be a positive
relationship between the two. It is obvious by looking at Figure 6 that such
a relationship is not present. Instead of a positive relationship, the
regression line has a slightly downward (negative) trend, although the
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. The linear equation for

112

Id.
See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
114
NFL Quarterback Rating Formula, http://www.nfl.com/help/quarterbackratingformula (last
visited Apr. 7, 2009).
115
Richard Sandomir, The N.F.L.'s Passer Rating, Arcane and Misunderstood, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2004, at D1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
116
Draft Order, http://www.nfl.com/stats/player (follow “complete list” hyperlink; then follow
“regular season” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). To compile the above statistic, I averaged the
passer rating for every qualified quarterback.
117
NFL Quarterback Rating Formula, supra note 114; see Sandomir, supra note 115 (noting also
that the statistic is weighted against freewheeling quarterbacks as it rewards a high percentage of
completions and yards per attempt while punishing interceptions).
118
NFL Quarterback Rating Formula, supra note 114.
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Figure 6 is
QB Rating = 75.65 - .12 x Wonderlic Score
(t-stat) (t-stat)
This means that with each point scored on the Wonderlic, a
quarterback’s rating actually decreases by .12. The p-value for this
analysis was 0.491, leading to the conclusion that no statistically
significant relationship between Wonderlic score and NFL passer rating
exists; therefore its use would likely not meet the “business necessity”
standard. This evidence, while certainly not dispositive, appears to show
that a player’s Wonderlic score has nothing to do with their ability to play
quarterback. And, if the Wonderlic cannot predict success for a
quarterback then, a fortiori, it should not predict success for other, less
intellectually demanding football positions.
Others have also examined the relationship between Wonderlic score
and quarterback performance, reaching different conclusions.
The
employee testing firm Criteria Corp. found a correlation between test score
and passing yards once a quarterback had thrown for over 1000 yards.119
The authors of this study originally noted that no association between
Wonderlic and passing yards could be found for the sixty-one quarterbacks
they evaluated that were drafted from 2000–2004.120 However, once they
included only quarterbacks who had passed for over 1000 yards, the
authors found a correlation coefficient (otherwise known as r)121 of .51—
showing strong positive correlation between aptitude and performance.122
While there is perhaps some validity to this study, using passing yards
with a 1000 yard cutoff may be misleading. In the 2008 regular season, the
average NFL team threw for 211.6 yards per game;123 throwing over 1000
yards in your career means that you have played in multiple games. Using
passing yards as a metric is an accurate way to measure long term skill and
durability, but conversely it brings in variables including resistance to
injury and a team’s propensity to throw the ball, something that varies
throughout the league and something that the Wonderlic is not designed to
predict.
Admittedly, passer rating may be an inaccurate measure in the case of
a quarterback who has one good game only to be injured and never play
119

Criteria Employees Testing Blog, The Wonderlic as a Predictor of Performance in the NFL,
http://blog.criteriacorp.com/blog/bid/4920/The-Wonderlic-as-a-Predictor-of-Performance-in-the-NFL
120
Id.
121
The correlation coefficient, or r, is a common measure of the correlation between two
variables. Ranging from -1 to +1, it measures the strength of linear dependence. See FREUND &
SIMON, supra note 58, at 470–71.
122
Criteria Employees Testing Blog, supra note 119.
123
To reach this number I averaged the passing yards per game average of all thirty-two NFL
teams. The statistics I used are available at http://www.teamrankings.com/nfl/stats/?cat=team&
pan=7&conf=0.
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again, or for a quarterback who is benched upon the return of the team’s
regular starter. Yet in today’s NFL the demand for decent quarterback
play is so high that even one well played game may be enough to lead to
future opportunity. Because quarterback rating is normalized per passing
attempt and is less affected by a team’s offensive scheme, it is a better
gauge of a quarterback’s ability for this study than passing yards. It
provides a standardized method of comparing Wonderlic performance to
in-game performance. As the above analysis shows, no statistically
significant relationship between Wonderlic score and quarterback
performance can be found, thus the test would be unlikely to meet
“business necessity.”
VI. THE CASE FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TEST
In the unlikely event that NFL’s use of the Wonderlic test were found
to be justified under the “business necessity” standard, plaintiffs would still
be entitled to offer an alternative selection practice that meets the
employer’s legitimate interests while having a less discriminatory effect.124
It must be noted that courts are generally apprehensive to mandate
alternative hiring practices because they are “less competent than
employers to restructure business practices . . . .”125 Also, the burden rests
squarely on the plaintiffs to demonstrate that this alternative practice exists
and that it would have less of a disparate impact on the protected class.126
Despite the plaintiff carrying this burden, there is some evidence of a
responsibility on the part of an employee who uses a selection procedure to
investigate alternatives and choose the one with the least discriminatory
impact.127 The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures
state that when a validity study is called for, the employer should include
“an investigation of suitable alternative selection procedures and suitable
alternative methods of using the selection procedure which has as little
adverse impact as possible . . . .”128 Once the employer has made a
“reasonable effort to become aware of such alternative procedures and
validity has been demonstrated in accord with these guidelines, the use of
the test or other selection procedure may continue until such time as it
should reasonably be reviewed for currency.”129 Although the Guidelines
themselves cannot impose an obligation on the employer to investigate
alternatives, they may not be ignored by the employer either.130 Courts
124

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)(2006).
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
126
LARSON, supra note 103, at § 24.01.
127
Id. at § 24.02.
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29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(B).
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Id.
130
LARSON, supra note 103, at § 24.02.
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have generally given little weight to the Guidelines’ directive and
alternative testing techniques proposed by plaintiffs rarely prevail,131
because they are usually unable to show that their plan would have a less
discriminatory effect or that it would serve the employer’s purposes.132
In Murphy v. Derwinski,133 the plaintiff was able to show an alternative
selection practice that the court found to meet the employer’s goals. In that
case, the plaintiff applied for employment as a Roman Catholic chaplain at
a VA hospital in Colorado but was rejected because she was not ordained
and did not have an ecclesiastical endorsement—a Veteran Administration
requirement.134 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
requirement had a disparate impact on women because the plaintiff, as a
woman, was unable to be ordained a priest.135
Although the court found that the decision could be justified by
business necessity, it ruled that requiring only the ecclesiastical
endorsement standard would ensure that the hospital’s patients receive
effective spiritual service while simultaneously not having a disparate
impact on women.136 In support of their conclusion, the court noted that
women serve as Roman Catholic chaplains in non-VA hospitals “without
disruption of service.137
Building on the case law mentioned above, this Note contends the NFL
should abandon its use of the Wonderlic test and replace it with a footballspecific intelligence test that (like the ecclesiastical endorsement
requirement) could equally serve the NFL’s interest in evaluating a
player’s mental acumen. This Note does not dispute the NFL’s need to
measure intelligence in order to provide more information to teams before
they make their draft choices. Players spend hours in meetings every day
and must know their responsibilities inside out.138 However, a player’s
answer on a question such as “[p]aper sells for 21 cents per pad. What will
four pads cost?” is not optimally designed to determine how well a player
will receive instruction from coaches, associate with teammates, or learn a
playbook.139 Legal arguments aside, a football-specific test would provide
more useful information for teams in assessing players. There is evidence
that some teams have already implemented such tests into their evaluation

131

Id. at § 24.03.
Id.
133
Murphy v. Derwinski, 990 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1993).
134
Id. at 542.
135
Id. at 544–45.
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Id. at 545–46.
137
Id at 545.
138
Elizabeth Merill, In NFL, the Playbook is Sacred, ESPN, Aug. 29, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/preview07/news/story?id=2973338.
139
See So, how do you score?, http://espn.go.com/page2/s/closer/020228test.html (last visited
Mar. 20, 2009) (providing fifteen sample Wonderlic questions).
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process, although few details are known as to what is tested.
The football-specific intelligence test this Note recommends would
require players at the combine to study, based on their position, plays in a
playbook upon which they would later be tested. Each team places great
emphasis on players understanding their respective playbooks—some can
be 800 pages in length and require two years study for full assimilation.141
Because agents, in preparation for the Wonderlic, frequently have their
players take a practice version of the test before the combine,142 in similar
fashion, a prospect under this Note’s recommendation would receive,
before the combine, a basic playbook to study in order to prepare for the
test.
The test could be administered in twelve minutes, identical to the
Wonderlic, but would assess players’ abilities to match specific names of
plays with their corresponding diagram. It could also give a name of a
play and ask a player to choose a multiple choice answer that best
describes the basic purpose of the play—whether it be a screen pass, play
action, draw, or any other formation. The test would evaluate a player’s
ability to think quickly, but in relation to information that they will actually
have to learn in order to play in the NFL.
Unfortunately, no promise can be made that such a test would not
continue to have a disparate impact on minority football players.
However, the test would be more likely to meet the business necessity
standard and would represent a good-faith attempt to put all potential
draftees on equal footing. Despite the courts’ unwillingness to make
business decisions for employers, it is entirely possible that a plaintiff
could show that a football-specific intelligence would be justified under
“business necessity,” while possibly not discriminating.
The NFL should not wait for legal challenge to begin investigating
different testing methods, but should take the initiative themselves, under
the Guidelines mentioned above, to develop a test that can accurately
predict football success by measuring the skills necessary to play the game.
The league should begin this process through an employment study known
as job analysis. Job analysis is a survey that establishes whether a
challenged employment practice sufficiently predicts success on the job by
determining what actually is required by the job.143 It is often conducted
140
See Corbett, supra note 5 (noting that New York Jets general manager Mike Tannenbaum and
former head coach Eric Mangini ask prospects game-related football questions in quick fashion, as well
as fire questions at them while watching college game film); see also Dougherty & Wyatt, supra note
49 (stating that Houston Texans general manager Charley Casserly uses another test that “relates more
to football.”).
141
Merill, supra note 138.
142
See Dougherty & Wyatt, supra note 48 (stating that because of the emphasis placed on the
Wonderlic, most agents ensure their clients take practice versions of the test).
143
LARSON, supra note 103, at § 27.05[1].
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through interviews with employers and employees and observing
employees while on the job.144 The league could conduct interviews with
teams to determine how football “intelligence” is best measured and from
that information develop a league-wide test administered at the combine.
Such a test might be slightly different from the one proposed above, but
having standardized results that are applicable to each prospect would
serve the NFL’s interest.
Finally, the question of why a potential NFL player has not yet
challenged the use of the Wonderlic must be addressed. I contend that a
player who is ultimately drafted in the first four rounds (out of a total of
seven), although perhaps negatively affected by the Wonderlic, is not
likely to contest its use even if they have a valid prima facie case. These
players usually have some form of commitment from the team that drafted
them and the negative impact a lawsuit would have on their reputation
might not make it a prudent career move. However, a minority player who
scored poorly on the Wonderlic and was drafted in the late rounds or not
drafted at all might be more willing to challenge its use. The reasoning for
this is simple: the employment substitutes available to a player if they do
not make the NFL, especially if they did not complete their degree, have
drastically different levels of compensation. Take an average player for
example: Leroy Harris, selected in the middle of the fourth round by the
Tennessee Titans in 2007, received a four-year $2.11 million dollar
contract.145 If the next best alternative to an NFL career is a salary of
$15,000 a year, a potential draft pick who was denied a spot in the NFL
because of his low Wonderlic score could find litigation appealing and
may even be wise to pursue it.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because of the Wonderlic’s racially-different results, the test almost
certainly has a disparate impact on minority players’ salary opportunities in
the NFL. Potential draft picks with higher Wonderlic scores are drafted
earlier, increasing their initial professional salaries. Black quarterbacks
who, on average, score lower on the test may be financially punished by it.
As shown above, the test does not meet the “business necessity” standard
because it cannot reliably predict job performance. In fact, it appears that
the higher a quarterback scores on the Wonderlic the worse they perform
on the field, and therefore it cannot be justified as representing the
minimum intelligence standards necessary for the job. This Note argues
that the league should abandon its use of the Wonderlic and instead
144

Id.
Leroy Harris Player Page http://www.rotoworld.com/Content/playerpages/player_
contract.aspx?sport=NFL&id=4311; SI.com 2007 NFL Draft, Round 4 http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com
/football/2007/draft/breakdowns/by_round/4.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2009).
145
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administer a football-related “intelligence” test to potential players. This
test might not have a disparate impact on minorities and would more likely
be justifiable under business necessity. Perhaps most importantly it could
provide the most relevant information in evaluating a football player’s
ability.

2009]

NFL’S WONDERLIC TEST

1693

APPENDIX
Figure 1: 1999–2006 Quarterback Score and Draft Position
Drew Henson
Alex Smith
Eli Manning
Todd Husak

42
40
39
39

192
1
1
202

Charlie Frye
Craig Krenzel
Ryan Fitzpatrick
Omar Jacobs
Aaron Rodgers
Drew Stanton

38
38
38
36
35
35

67
148
250
164
24
43

J.T. O'Sullivan
Kellen Clemens
Matt Leinart
Charlie Whitehurst
Tom Brady
Giovanni Carmazzi

35
35
35
33
33
32

186
49
10
81
199
65

Jesse Palmer
Joey Harrington
Patrick Ramsey
Sage Rosenfels
Andrew Walter
Craig Nall

32
32
32
32
31
31

125
3
32
109
69
164

Dave Ragone
J.P. Losman
Kliff Kingsbury
Kurt Kittner
Matt Schaub
Ingle Martin

31
31
31
31
31
30

88
22
201
158
90
148

John Beck
Josh Heupel
Josh McCown
Matt Mauck

30
30
30
30

40
177
81
225
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Philip Rivers
Quincy Carter

30
30

4
8

Stefan LeFors

30

121

Brady Quinn

29

22

Chris Weinke

29

106

Mark Bulger

29

168

Rex Grossman

29

22

Brian St. Pierre

28

163

Brooks Bollinger

28

200

Cade McNown

28

12

Drew Brees

28

32

Kevin Kolb

28

36

Seth Burford

28

216

Josh Booty

27

162

Kyle Boller

27

19

Mike McMahon

27

149

Tim Rattay

27

212

Adrian McPherson

26

152

Akili Smith

26

3

Carson Palmer

26

1

Dan Orlovsky

26

145

Jay Cutler

26

11

Kyle Orton

26

106

Ben Roethlisberger

25

11

Bradlee Van Pelt

25

250

Brock Huard

25

77

Byron Leftwich

25

7

Casey Bramlett

25

218

Chad Pennington

25

18

Joe Germaine

25

101

Josh Harris

25

187

Ken Dorsey

25

241

Randy Fasani

25

137

Shaun King

25

50

Spergon Wynn

25

183
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David Carr

24

1

Jamarcus Russell

24

1

John Navarre

24

202

Luke McCown

24

106

Marques Tuiasosopo

24

59

James Killian

23

229

Jason Campbell

23

25

Jeff Smoker

23

201

Jordan Palmer

23

205

B.J. Symons

22

248

Chris Simms

22

97

Tim Couch

22

1

Jeff Rowe

21

151

Scott Covington

21

245

Tyler Thigpen

21

217

Cody Pickett

20

217

Corey Jenkins

20

181

David Greene

20

85

Michael Vick

20

1

A.J. Feeley

19

155

Bruce Gradkowski

19

194

Derek Anderson

19

213

D.J. Shockley

19

223

Tavaris Jackson

19

33

Daunte Culpepper

18

11

Jarious Jackson

18

214

Joe Hamilton

18

234

Aaron Brooks

17

131

Rohan Davey

17

117

Chris Redman

16

75

Vince Young

16

3

Jim Sorgi

15

193

David Garrard

14

108

Donovan McNabb

14

2

Seneca Wallace

14

110
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Tee Martin

11

163

Michael Bishop

10

277

Figure 2: Wonderlic Score by Race
Average Score
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Black

Standard
Deviation
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28.15
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# of Observations
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Figure 3: 1999-2006 Quarterback Wonderlic Score vs. NFL Draft Position
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Figure 4: Average Draft Position When Wonderlic Score is One Standard
Deviation Above and Below the Mean

Wonderlic Score
Draft Postion

One Std. Deviation
Above
≥33
107.8

One Std. Deviation
Below
≤19
136.4
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2009]

NFL’S WONDERLIC TEST

1697

Figure 5: Quarterback Wonderlic Score and NFL Passer Rating
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Patrick Ramsey
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Jesse Palmer
Andrew Walter
J.P. Losman
Matt Schaub
Rick Mirer
John Beck
Philip Rivers
Josh McCown
Quincy Carter
Kerry Collins
David Klingler
Rex Grossman
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Doug Johnson
Cade McNown
Peyton Manning
Kyle Boller
Mike McMahon
Tim Rattay
Ryan Leaf
Kelly Stouffer
Rich Gannon
Jay Cutler
Kyle Orton
Jared Lorenzen
Carson Palmer
Akili Smith
Tony Banks
Rob Johnson
Rodney Peete
Ben
Roethlisberger
Bradlee Van Pelt
Byron Leftwich
Ken Dorsey
Randy Fasani
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28
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Mark Brunell
Brett Favre
Chris Miller
Don Majkowski
Cody Pickett
Michael Vick
Tavaris Jackson
Bruce
Gradkowski
Derek Anderson
AJ Feeley
Cleo Lemon
Daunte
Culpepper
Ray Lucas
Aaron Brooks
Jeff Blake
Vinny
Testaverde
Vince Young
Chris Redman
Anthony Wright
Heath Shuler
Elvis Grbac
Jim Sorgi
Steve McNair
Randall
Cunningham
Jim Kelly
Dan Marino
Terry Bradshaw
Seneca Wallace
David Garrard
Donovan
McNabb
Charlie Batch
Kordell Stewart
Neil O'Donnell
Jeff George
Vince Evans
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22
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20
20
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84.2
85.7
74.9
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16.4
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Figure 6: Wonderlic Score vs. NFL Passer Rating
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